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Abstract— Channel allocation was extensively studied in the
framework of cellular networks. But the emergence of new system
concepts, such as cognitive radio systems, has brought this topic
into the focus of research again. In this paper, we study in detail
the problem of competitive multi-radio multi-channel allocation
in wireless networks. We study the existence of Nash equilibria in
a static game and we conclude that, in spite of the non-cooperative
behavior of such devices, their channel allocation results in a
load-balancing solution. In addition, we consider the fairness
properties of the resulting channel allocations and their resistance
to the possible coalitions of a subset of players. Finally, we present
two algorithms that achieve a load-balancing Nash equilibrium
channel allocation; each of them using a different set of available
information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks provide a flexible and cost-efficient
method for establishing communication between different par-
ties. Each wireless network operates in a frequency band as-
signed by the authorities that regulate the frequency spectrum
in a given country. In general, the communication medium as-
signed to a given network is shared among the communication
devices using some multiple access technique.
Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) is one of the
widely used techniques that enables several users to share a
communication medium that consists of a given frequency
band [23], [24]. The basic principle of FDMA is to split up
the available bandwidth to distinct sub-bands called channels.
Assigning the radio transceivers to these channels is commonly
referred to as the channel allocation problem.1 Not surpris-
ingly, an efficient channel allocation is a cornerstone of the
design of wireless networks.
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic analysis of
fixed channel allocation strategies of devices that use multiple
radios. Using a static non-cooperative game, we analyze the
scenario of a single collision domain, i.e., where each of the
devices can interfere with a transmission of every other device.
We derive the Nash equilibria in this game and show that
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1In the literature, the terms channel assignment and frequency assignment
are also used for the channel allocation problem.
they result in load balancing over the channels. Our main
results show that there exist two types of Nash equilibria:
in the first type, each user distributes his radios over the
available channels, whereas in the second type, some users
allocate multiple radios on certain channels. We also study
fairness issues and the problem of coalition formation in the
channel allocation problem. We show that a Nash equilibrium
that resists coalitions of users is necessarily fair as well.
Furthermore, we propose three algorithms to achieve the Nash
equilibria. The first is a sequential algorithm that needs global
coordination, the second is a distributed algorithm that needs
perfect information and the third is a distributed algorithm that
is based on imperfect information. We provide the proof for
the convergence properties of these algorithms.
This work is a first step towards a deeper understanding of
the non-cooperative behavior of such devices and is applicable
in particular in the emerging field of cognitive radio systems
[15].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
related work on channel allocation and channel access in
wireless networks. In Section III, we introduce our system
model along with a game-theoretic description of competitive
channel allocation. In Section IV, we provide a comprehensive
analysis of the Nash equilibria in the channel allocation game.
We study fairness issues in Section V. In addition, we provide
some results on coalition-proof Nash equilibria in Section VI.
In Section VII, we propose two algorithms to reach the desired
Nash equilibria and study their convergence properties. Finally,
we conclude in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been a significant amount of work on channel
allocation in wireless networks, notably for cellular networks.
Channel allocation schemes in cellular networks can be di-
vided into three categories: fixed channel allocation (FCA),
dynamic channel allocation (DCA) and hybrid channel allo-
cation (HCA), which combines the two former methods.
In a fixed channel allocation scheme, the same number
of channels are permanently allocated to the radios at the
base stations. To study fixed channel allocation, most authors
used graph coloring / labelling techniques (e.g., in [25]). The
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FCA method performs very well under a high traffic load,
but it cannot adapt to changing traffic conditions or user
distributions.
To overcome the inflexibility of FCA, many authors pro-
pose dynamic channel allocation (DCA) methods (e.g. as
presented in [9], [26]). In contrast to FCA, there is no constant
relationship between the base stations in a cell and their
respective channels. All channels are available for each base
station and they are assigned dynamically as new users arrive.
Typically, the available channels are evaluated according to
a cost function and the one with the minimum cost is used
[10]. Due to its dynamic property, the DCA can adapt to
changing traffic demand. Because adaptation implies some
cost, it performs worse than FCA in the case of a heavy traffic
load. For a comprehensive survey on the topic, we refer the
reader to [16].
Due to the emergence of alternative communication tech-
nologies, channel allocation schemes are becoming a focus of
research again. Mishra et al. [20] propose a channel allocation
method for wireless local area networks (WLANs) based
weighted graph coloring. Zheng and Cao [27] present a rule-
based spectrum management scheme for cognitive radios.
Recently, several researchers have considered devices using
multiple radios, notably in mesh networks (for a survey on
mesh networks, see [2]). In the multi-radio communication
context, channel allocation and access also became one of the
crucial topics. Related work on multi-radio medium access
includes, but is not restricted to [1], [3], [22].
In all the related work cited so far, the authors assumed
that the radio devices cooperate to achieve a high system
performance. But this assumption might not hold, as the users
of these devices are usually selfish and they want to maximize
their own performance without necessarily respecting the
system objectives. Game theory provides a straightforward
tool to study medium access problems in competitive wireless
networks and has been applied to the CSMA/CA protocol
[7], [17] and to the Aloha protocol [19]. Furthermore, a fixed
channel allocation game was presented in [14] based on graph
coloring. Unfortunately, their model does not apply to multi-
radio devices. For cognitive radio networks, the authors of
[21] propose a dynamic channel allocation scheme based on a
potential game. In addition, they suggest another technique
based on machine learning with different utility functions.
Cao and Zheng [8] propose distributed spectrum allocation
in cognitive radio networks based on local bargaining.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND CONCEPTS
We assume that the available frequency band is divided into
orthogonal channels of the same bandwidth using the FDMA
method (e.g., 8 orthogonal channels in case of the IEEE
802.11a protocol). We denote the set of available orthogonal
channels by C.
In our model, pairs of users want to communicate with each
other over a single hop. We assume that each user participates
in only one such communication session, hence we denote
the set of such communication links by N . Each user owns a
device equipped with k ≤ |C| radio transmitters, all having
the same communication capabilities. The communication
between two devices is bidirectional and they always have
some packets to exchange. Due to the bidirectional links,
the sender and the receiver are able to coordinate and thus
to select the same channels to communicate. Accordingly,
we assume that the sender controls the communication in
a certain pair and we refer to him as a selfish player. The
objective of each player is to maximize his total throughput
or channel utilization. We assume that there is a finite number
of players. We further assume that each device can hear the
transmissions of every other device if they are using the same
channel. This means that the players reside in a single collision
domain. We make this assumption to avoid the hidden terminal
problem described for example in [24]. Because the devices
reside in a single collision domain, it is reasonable to assume
that the channels have roughly the same expected channel
characteristics.
We assume that there is a mechanism that enables the
players to use multiple channels to communicate at the same
time (as it is implemented in [1] for example). We denote the
number of radios of player i using channel c by ki,c for every
c ∈ C. For the simplicity of presentation, let us denote the
set of channels used by player i by Ci, where Ci ⊂ C and
0 ≤ |Ci| ≤ k. We further assume that there is no limitation on
the number of radios per channel.
We formulate the multi-radio channel allocation problem as
a non-cooperative game as follows. We define the strategy of
player i as his channel allocation vector:
si = {ki,1, . . . , ki,|C|} (1)
Hence, his strategy consists in defining the number of radios
on each of the channels.2 The strategy vectors of all players
defines the strategy matrix S (i.e., the strategy profile), where
the row i of the matrix corresponds to the strategy vector of
player i:
S =
 s1. . .
s|N |
 (2)
Furthermore, we denote the strategy matrix except for the
strategy of player i by S−i.
Figure 1 presents an example channel allocation with six
available channels (|C| = 6), four players (|N | = 4) and each
user device equipped by four radios (k = 4).
The total number of radios employed by player i can
be written as ki =
∑
c ki,c. Similarly, we can obtain the
number of radios using a particular channel kc =
∑
i ki,c. In
Figure 1, each player has a radio on channel c1, but channel
c5 is occupied only by player p2. Player p3 employs two
radios on channel c2 to get more bandwidth on that particular
channel. Regarding the number of radios per player, we have
kp1 = kp2 = kp3 = 4 and kp4 = 2, meaning that player p4 is
not using all of his radios.
We assume that the players are rational and their objective
is to maximize their payoff in the network. We denote the
payoff of player i by Ui. For simplicity, we assume that each
2Note that this number can be zero.
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channels
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
channels: c1 - c6
number of radios
p1 p1 p1 p1
p2 p2 p2
p3 p3
p3
p3
p4
p4
players: p1 - p4
c6
p2
Fig. 1. An example for a channel allocation, where |C| = 6, |N | = 4 and
k = 4.
player i wants to maximize his aggregated rate (Ri) in the
system and thus the payoff function is the achieved bitrate.
We assume that the total rate on channel c is shared equally
among the radio transmitters using that channel. We denote the
rate of one radio on channel c by Rc(kc). As we assume that
channels have the same bandwidth and channel characteristics,
the achieved rate does not depend on the channel and thus we
can write R(kc) for any channel c ∈ C. The fair rate allocation
is achieved, for example, by using a reservation-based TDMA
schedule on a given channel. A similar result was reported by
Bianchi in [6] for the CSMA/CA protocol. Even if the radio
transmitters are controlled by selfish users in the CSMA/CA
protocol, they can achieve this fair sharing as shown in [7].
We further assume that the total rate Rt(kc) = kc · R(kc)
on a channel c (i.e., the sum of the achieved throughput of
all players on channel c) is a non-increasing function of the
number of radios kc deployed on this channel. In fact Rt(kc)
is independent of kc for an ideal TDMA protocol. In random
access protocols, such as CSMA/CA, the total rate function
Rt(kc) becomes a decreasing function of kc for kc > 1
due to packet collisions. If kc = 0, we define Rt(0) = 0;
note however that this case has no relevance in our model.
We emphasize that our system model is general enough to
incorporate many multiple access techniques, such as TDMA
or CSMA/CA.
Figure 2 presents the total rate Rt(kc) as a function of the
number of radios using channel c.
number of radios (kx)
τt(kx)
ideal TDMA
practical CSMA/CA
Fig. 2. The total rate Rt(kc) for different MAC protocols.
If player i chooses to operate ki,c radios in a given channel,
his rate on this channel can be written as Ri,c = ki,c ·R(kc).
We assume that the players do not cheat at the MAC layer
as opposed to the model for example in [7]. Thus, we can
write that Ri,c > 0 for all c ∈ C, where ki,c > 0. Recall
that in Figure 1, the higher the number of radios in a given
channel is, the lower the rate per radio is. Hence, for example
for player p2, we have Rp2,c1 < Rp2,c4 < Rp2,c3 < Rp2,c5 .
We can obtain the rate Ri for player i by Ri =
∑
cRi,c.
In summary, we can write the payoff function for player i
as:
Ui(S) = Ri =
∑
c∈C
Ri,c =
∑
c∈C
ki,c ·R(kc) (3)
We model the channel allocation problem with a single stage
game, which corresponds to a fixed channel allocation among
the players.
In order to study the strategic interaction of the players, we
first introduce the concept of Nash equilibrium [12], [13].
Definition 1: (Nash Equilibrium – NE): The strategy matrix
S∗ = {s∗1, . . . , s∗|N|} defines a Nash Equilibrium (NE), if for
every player i, we have:
Ui(s∗i , S
∗
−i) ≥ Ui(s
′
i, S
∗
−i) (4)
for every strategy s
′
i.
In other words, in a NE none of the players can unilaterally
change its strategy to increase its payoff. A NE solution is
often inefficient from the system point of view. We charac-
terize the efficiency of the solution by the concept of Pareto-
optimality.
Definition 2: (Pareto-Optimality): The strategy matrix Spo
is Pareto-optimal if @S′ such that:
Ui(S
′
) ≥ Ui(Spo), ∀i (5)
with strict inequality for at least one player i.
This means that in a Pareto-optimal channel allocation Spo one
cannot improve the payoff of any player i without decreasing
the payoff of at least one other player j.
Finally, let us express the system inefficiency due to selfish
behavior using the concept of the price of anarchy defined in
[18]:
Definition 3: (Price-of-Anarchy – POA): The price of an-
archy (POA) of a game is the ratio between the sum of the
payoffs of all players in a globally optimal solution compared
to the sum of the payoffs achieved in a worst-case Nash
equilibrium.
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we study the existence of Nash equilibria
in the single collision domain channel allocation game. Note
that we omit the proofs of the results due to space limitations,
but we provide an extended version of this work in [11].
It is straightforward to see that if the total number of radios
is smaller than or equal to the number of channels, then a flat
channel allocation, in which the number of radios per channel
does not exceed one, is a Nash equilibrium.
Fact 1: If |N | · k ≤ |C|, then any channel allocation, in
which kc ≤ 1,∀c ∈ C is a Pareto-optimal NE.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that |N |·k > |C|,
hence the devices have a conflict during the channel allocation
process.
In the following, we consider a NE strategy matrix in the
multi-radio channel allocation game denoted by S∗, where
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s∗i ∈ S∗ is the NE strategy of player i (i.e., the i-th row of
the matrix).
We first show the following intuitive result: a selfish player
should use all of his radios in order to maximize his total rate.
This is a necessary condition for a Nash equilibria.
Lemma 1: If S∗ is a NE of the multi-radio channel alloca-
tion game, then ki = k,∀i.
In the example presented in Figure 1, Lemma 1 does not
hold for players p4, because it uses only two radios. Hence,
the example cannot be a NE.
Let us now consider two arbitrary channels c and d. Without
loss of generality, we assume that there are more radios using
channel c, meaning that kc ≥ kd, and denote their difference
by:
δc,d = kc − kd (6)
Let us now divide the channels in a certain channel allo-
cation S into three sets. We define the set of channels C+
with the maximum number of radios, i.e., where c ∈ C+ has
kc = maxl∈C kl. Similarly, let us define the set of channels
C− for which kd = kd−1. We denote the set of the remaining
channels by C−−. In Figure 1, C+ = {c1}, C− = {c2, c4} and
C−− = {c3, c5, c6}.
In the following proposition, we show that in a Nash equi-
librium, the difference in the total number of radios between
any two channels cannot exceed one.
Proposition 1: If S∗ is a NE in the multi-radio channel
allocation game, then δc,d ≤ 1 for all c, d ∈ C.
Proposition 1 shows that in a NE only C+ and C− exist. This
establishes an interesting property about NE: In fact, all NE
channel allocations achieve load-balancing over the channels
in C. Based on Proposition 1, we express a set of sufficient
conditions for the NE.
Theorem 1: Assume that |N | · k > |C|. Then a channel
allocation S∗ is a NE if the two following conditions hold:
. dc,d ≤ 1 for any c, d ∈ C and
. ki,c ≤ 1 for any c ∈ C.
An example of a NE channel allocation corresponding to
Theorem 1 is shown in Figure 3.
channelsc1 c2 c3 c4 c5
p1 p1p1
p2
p2
p2 p3
p3
p3
p4
p4 p4
c6
p1
p2 p3
p4
Fig. 3. A NE channel allocation corresponding to Theorem 1. Here |C| = 6,
|N | = 4 and k = 4. Each player distributes his radios over the channels (i.e.,
ki,c ≤ 1,∀i, ∀c).
Theorem 1 suggests that players should distribute their
radios over the set of available channels. Surprisingly, there
exist another type of Nash equilibria in which some players
use multiple radios in some channels. We characterize these
Nash equilibria in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Assume that |N | · k > |C|. Then a channel
allocation S∗ is a NE if the following conditions hold:
. dc,d ≤ 1 for any c, d ∈ C and
. for any player i that has ki,c ≥ 2, ki,c ≤ τ(kc−1)−τ(kc+1)τ(kc−1)−τ(kc)
also holds; and
. for any player i that has ki,c ≥ 2 and c ∈ C+, it is also
true that ki,d ≥ ki,c − 1, ∀d ∈ C−
Figure 4 presents an example for Theorem 2 assuming that
the second (numerical) condition of the theorem holds.
channels
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
p1
p1
p1 p2 p2p2
p3 p3p3
p4p4p4
c6
p1
p2 p3
p4
Fig. 4. An example for a NE channel allocation corresponding to Theorem 2.
Here |C| = 6, |N | = 4 and k = 4. Note that player p1 uses multiple radios
on channel c1.
In summary, Theorems 1 and 2 characterize two types
of Nash equilibria. In the first type, each player distributes
his radios such that he has at most one radio per channel.
Intuitively, this results in load balancing. Note, however, the
existence of a second type of Nash equilibria, in which
some players allocate multiple radios on certain channels. We
mention that there could be a small set of other Nash equilibria
that are not covered by these theorems, but they exist for very
specific conditions on the total throughput function Rt(kc).
In the next theorem, we will show that allowing selfish
channel allocation results in an efficient spectrum utilization
if the rate function is independent of the number of radios on
a certain channel.
Theorem 3: Assume that |N | · k > |C| and the total rate
function Rt(kc) is independent of kc on any channel c. Then
any NE channel allocation S∗ is Pareto-optimal.
It is very intuitive to also state the following fact.
Fact 2: If |N | ·k > |C| and Rt(kc) is a decreasing function
of kc, then every Pareto-optimal channel allocation has the
property kc = 1, ∀c ∈ C.
Note that this result does not hold for decreasing total
rate functions, because the players might remove some of
their radios to decrease the total number of radios on certain
channels. If they do this mutually, they could mutually increase
each others payoff.
Using the concept of the price of anarchy (POA) introduced
before, we can express the inefficiency caused by selfish
behavior.
Theorem 4: If Rt(kc) is a decreasing function of kc, then
the price of anarchy (POA) is given by:
POA =
Rt(1)
(kc + 1− |N |·k|C| ) · (Rt(kc)−Rt(kc + 1)) +Rt(kc + 1)
(7)
where kc =
⌊
|N |·k
|C|
⌋
(i.e., kc + 1 =
⌈
|N |·k
|C|
⌉
).
We can notice that if Rt(kc) is close to a constant function,
then the price of anarchy is close to one. This means that
for these type of total rate functions, the Nash equilibria are
system-efficient.
V. FAIRNESS ISSUES
In this section, we study the fairness properties of the selfish
multi-radio channel allocation game. Fairness is an important
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aspect of resource allocation problems in general, and of
computer networks in particular. Very often, a system-efficient
resource allocation gives more (or all) resources to a few
players while neglecting other players (e.g. in the NE derived
for the CSMA/CA protocol in [7]). Such a solution might
be system-efficient, but it is not desired from the network
designer’s point of view (i.e., neither from the users’ point
of view). In this section, we will show, which additional
properties are required to make a NE a fair channel allocation.
We have seen in Section IV that in the selfish multi-radio
channel allocation problem, the NE achieve load balancing.
Unfortunately, these NE might be highly unfair by giving
advantage to some players and neglecting others. For example,
in the channel allocation presented in Figure 4 assuming that
the total rate function Rt(·) is constant, player p1 has the total
rate U1 = 53 , whereas player p4 has the total rate U4 =
4
3 .
In order to study the fairness properties of the NE channel
allocations, we use a particular metric called max-min fairness
(MMF) as defined in [5]:
Definition 4: (Max-Min Fairness – MMF): The strategy
matrix Smmf is max-min fair if the payoff of player i cannot
be increased without decreasing the payoff of another player
j for which Ui(Smmf ) ≥ Uj(Smmf ).
Using this concept, we identify the max-min fair NE channel
allocations as expressed in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5: A NE channel allocation S∗ is max-min fair if
and only if
∑
c∈Cmin ki,c =
∑
c∈Cmin kj,c for all i, j ∈ N .
This implies that Ui = Uj ,∀i, j ∈ N .
In other words, if the total number of radios in the least
allocated channels are equal for every player, the NE alloca-
tion is max-min fair. For example, the channel allocation in
Figure 3 is max-min fair , but the one shown in Figure 4 is
not.
From this theorem, we can immediately see that the per-
fectly balanced channel allocation is also max-min fair.
Corollary 1: If S∗ is a NE such that C− = C+ (i.e., kc =
kd, ∀c, d ∈ C), then S∗ is max-min fair as well.
VI. COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA
The definition of NE expresses the resistance to the devi-
ation of a single player. In a realistic situation, it might be
possible that several players collude to increase their payoff
at the expense of other players. Such a collusion is called a
coalition. The problem of how these coalitions are formed is
a research topic in itself, thus in this paper we assume that
any group of players can form a coalition. We can generalize
the notion of NE for coalitions as defined in [4].
Definition 5: (Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium – CPNE):
The strategy matrix Scpne defines a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium if there does not exist any coalition Γ ⊂ N and
any strategy of this coalition S
′
Γ such that the following set of
conditions is true:
Ui(S
′
Γ, S
cpne
−Γ ) ≥ Ui(ScpneΓ , Scpne−Γ ), ∀i ∈ Γ (8)
with strict inequality for at least one player i ∈ Γ.
This means that no coalition can deviate from Scpne such
that the payoff of at least one of its members increases and the
payoff of other members do not change.3 From the definition,
we can immediately see the following fact:
Players in a coalition can help each other in two ways. The
first possibility is if a player relocates his radio to improve
the payoff of another player he is in a coalition with. This
property is expressed for two players in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: If there exist two channels c ∈ C+ and d ∈ C−
and two players i, j ∈ N such that ki,c > 0 and kj,c > 0
whereas ki,d = 0 and kj,d = 0, then the NE channel allocation
Scpne is not coalition-proof.
The players in a coalition can also improve their payoff if
they mutually remove some radios to reduce the number of
radios contending for these channels. This property is shown
for two players in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3: If there exist two channels c, d ∈ C+ or c, d ∈
C− and two players i, j ∈ N such that ki,c > 0, kj,c > 0,
ki,d > 0 and kj,d > 0, then the NE channel allocation Scpne
is not coalition-proof.
Based on Lemmas 2 and 3, we can prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 6: If in a NE channel allocation S∗ it is true that
|C+| ≥ 2, then S∗ is not coalition-proof.
We narrowed down the set of potential coalition-proof Nash
equilibria by Theorem 6. However, we could not find a set
of sufficient conditions for coalition-proof Nash equilibria.
Nevertheless, we can show that each coalition-proof NE is
max-min fair as well. Note that the converse is not true.
Theorem 7: If NE channel allocation S∗ is coalition-proof,
then it is max-min fair as well.
As a summary, Figure 5 shows all channel allocations by
properties.
All channel allocations
Nash equilibria
Max-min fair Nash equilibria
Coalition-proof Nash equilibria
Fig. 5. Summary of channel allocations with different properties.
VII. CONVERGENCE TO A NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We have demonstrated in Section IV that the non-
cooperative behavior of the selfish players leads to load-
balancing Nash equilibria. In this section, we propose two
algorithms, each using a different set of available information,
to enable the selfish players to converge to one of these
Nash equilibria from an arbitrary initial configuration. The
two algorithms are the following: 1) a centralized algorithm
using perfect information and 2) a distributed algorithm using
imperfect (local) information.
3Note that our definition corresponds to the principle of weak deviation.
One can define the notion of a strict deviation of a coalition which requires
that each coalition member increases its payoff by deviating. In the literature
of coalition-proof equilibria, both concepts are used.
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A. Centralized Algorithm Using Perfect Information
We have proved in Propositionr˜efprop:lem6-everywhere-no-
diff2 that a Nash equilibrium channel allocation has a load-
balancing property. In addition, we have shown in Theorem 3
that for a constant total rate function the Nash equilibria are
Pareto-optimal as well. First we present the pseudo-code of
Algorithm 1, a simple centralized algorithm to achieve one of
these efficient Nash equilibria.
Algorithm 1 NE channel allocation with global coordination
and perfect information
1: for i = 1 to |N | do
2: for j = 1 to k do
3: if kc = kd,∀c, d ∈ C then
4: use radio j on a channel c, where ki,c = 0
5: else
6: use radio j on a channel c, where kc = mind∈C kd
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
Using the algorithm, the players allocate their radios such
that they fill the channels almost equally. Note that the algo-
rithm requires the sequential action of the players and hence it
needs global coordination. In addition, the players must have
perfect information about the number of radios on each of
the channels. This can be achieved by the global coordination
mentioned before or by having an extra radio per device for
scanning the channels. Global coordination is unlikely to exist
in a wireless networking scenario with selfish players. The
second assumption about perfect information might not hold
either, because selfish players should allocate all of their radios
for communication as shown in Lemma 1. It is possible to
model the cost of scanning with one radio instead of using it
for communication. The investigation of this issue is part of
our future work.
B. Distributed Algorithm Using Imperfect Information
In order to overcome the limitations of the centralized
algorithm proposed in Section VII-A, we suggest a second
algorithm that does not require global coordination and uses
only imperfect information. In this subsection, we assume that
players have imperfect information, meaning that they know
the total number of radios on only those channels on which
they operate a radio.
We define a round-based distributed algorithm that works
as follows. First, we assume that there exists a random radio
assignment of the players over the channels. For simplicity, we
focus on the Nash equilibria that correspond to Theorem 1.
This means that we assume that no player allocates more
than one device on any channel. After the initial channel
assignment, each player tries to improve his total throughput
by reorganizing his radios. To avoid that all players change
together, we leverage the technique of backoff mechanism well
known in the IEEE 802.11 medium access technology [24].
We define a backoff window BW and each player chooses
a random initial value for his backoff counter with uniform
probability from the set {1, . . . , BW}. Then in every round
each player decreases his backoff counter by one and applies
the re-allocation of his radios only when the backoff counter
reaches zero. After he changes his channel allocation, he resets
the backoff counter as described previously. We can notice that
using the backoff mechanism, the players play a game in an
almost sequential order.
In each round, when player i’s backoff counter is equal
to zero, he calculates the average number of devices on the
channels he knows (recall that we denote this set by Ci). We
denote the average number of devices on the channels in Ci
by Ki. For each channel d ∈ Ci with kd − Ki ≥ 1 player i
moves his radio to another channel c /∈ Ci. The probability to
chose a channel c /∈ Ci is 1|C\Ci| . This is the first property of
the algorithm with imperfect information.
We can show that the above procedure reaches a stable
state. Unfortunately, the available local information might be
insufficient for the players to determine if the achieved stable
state is Nash equilibrium. We show an example for such a
“false Nash equilibrium” in Figure 6.
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Fig. 6. An example for a stability state using the distributed algorithm
with imperfect information. Here |C| = 6, |N | = 5 and k = 3. Each
player believes that this is a Nash equilibrium due to the insufficient local
information.
In order to solve the problem of inefficient stable states,
we introduce the following mechanism: player i checks the
number of radios for each of the channels d ∈ Ci as suggested
above and with a small probability ² he moves his radio
to another channel c /∈ Ci even if 0 < kd − Ki < 1.
He chooses the new channel c with a probability 1|C\Ci| as
presented before. This second property allows us to resolve
the inefficient stability states, but at the same time, it will also
cause the instability of the Nash equilibria.
We provide the description of our algorithm below. Note
that this algorithm includes both properties: 1) the backoff
mechanism to randomize the changes and 2) the mechanism
to resolve inefficient stable states.
Due to the second property of our algorithm, it does
not perfectly converge to the existing Nash equilibria (more
precisely, it converges there with high probability, but it does
not stay in a Nash equilibrium solution). Nevertheless, we can
observe that the algorithm remains in states that are “close”
to Nash equilibria in terms of load-balancing. We demonstrate
this intuition by the simulations presented in Section VII-C.
C. Simulation Results for Algorithm 2
We implemented Algorithm 2 in MATLAB and with a
special focus on wireless IEEE 802.11a protocol (meaning
that we have chosen 8 orthogonal channels as a default value
for |C|). In this subsection, we present our simulation results
showing the convergence time and efficiency of Algorithm 2.
In each of the simulations, we assume a constant total rate
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Algorithm 2 Distributed NE channel allocation algorithm
using local information
1: random channel allocation
2: while () do
3: get the current channel allocation
4: for i = 1 to |N | do
5: if backoff counter is 0 then
6: if (maxc∈Ci (kc)−minc∈Ci (kc) > 1) then
7: for j = 1 to k do
8: assume that radio j uses channel d
9: if kd > Ki then
10: move the radio j from d to c /∈ Ci, where c is chosen
with uniform random probability from the set C\Ci
11: end if
12: end for
13: else
14: for j = 1 to k do
15: assume that radio j uses channel d
16: if kd ≥ Ki then
17: move the radio j from d to c /∈ Ci with probability
², where c is chosen with uniform random probability
from the set C\Ci
18: end if
19: end for
20: end if
21: reset the backoff counter to a new value from the set
{1, . . . , BW}
22: else
23: decrease the backoff counter value by one
24: end if
25: end for
26: end while
function Rt(·). Note however, that the algorithm shows similar
properties for any decreasing total rate function introduced in
Section III.
Let us first highlight the best and worst case in terms of the
desired load-balancing for Algorithm 2. The best case is one of
the NE channel allocations, and the worst case is characterized
by the fact that there exist k channels where each of the
players have a radio, whereas the rest of the channels have
no radios at all. In Figure 7, we present an example of the
worst case channel allocation that is opposed to the best case
NE in Figure 3 for |C| = 6 and we refer to it as unbalanced
(UB) channel allocation.
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Fig. 7. An example for a worst case channel allocation for Algorithm 2.
The channel allocation is completely unbalanced, as opposed to the NE (best
case) shown in Figure 3. Here |C| = 6, |N | = 4 and k = 4.
We calculate the average number of radios per channel as
m = |N |·k|C| . We can compare the utilization of every channel
c to the average to achieve the total balance of the channel
allocation S:
Definition 6: (Balance:) The balance β of a channel allo-
cation S is defined as the sum β(S) =
∑
c∈|C| |kc −m|.
The notion of balance allows us to define the efficiency of
a given channel allocation as a proportion between the worst
case and the best case channel allocations.
Definition 7: (Efficiency:) The efficiency φ of a channel
allocation S is defined as φ(S) = β(SUB)−β(S)β(SUB)−β(SNE) .
Let us emphasize that for any channel allocation S, it is true
that 0 ≤ φ(S) ≤ 1. Furthermore, φ(SNE) = 1 and φ(SUB) =
0 as desired by this measure.
Let us now define the average efficiency over time and the
efficiency ratio. To this end, we denote the efficiency in round
t by φ(t, S).
Definition 8: (Average efficiency and efficiency ratio:) The
average efficiency φ at round T is defined as the sum
φ(T, S) =
∑T
t=1 φ(t, S). We define the efficiency ratio as
Φ = lim infT→∞
φ(T,S)
T .
Note that the efficiency ratio expresses the performance of
the distributed channel allocation algorithm per round over a
long period of time. In our simulations, we applied a finite
simulation time, hence we measured the efficiency ratio for
T = 10000 rounds.
Finally, let us define the convergence time of Algorithm 2
as follows.
Definition 9: (Convergence Time): We define the conver-
gence time of Algorithm 2, as the time when the channel
allocation efficiency first reaches the value of one (i.e., the
efficiency of a NE, φ(SNE)).
We assume that the duration of one round in the updating
algorithm is 10ms. This duration of one round corresponds
roughly to the time needed for all these devices to transmit
one MAC layer packet, i.e., the time that the devices can learn
about other devices in the channel. As mentioned previously,
we run each simulation for 10000 rounds, which corresponds
to 100s according to the assumption above. Each average value
is the result of 100 simulation runs. For the convergence time
simulations, we present our results with a 0.95 confidence level
on the mean value.
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Fig. 8. One simulation run: Efficiency and averaged efficiency vs. time using
the values |C| = 8, |N | = 10, k = 3 and W = 15.
Let us first present an example run for our distributed
algorithm with imperfect information in Figure 8 for 20s. One
can notice that the algorithm quickly reaches the NE state and
thus the average efficiency converges to one. Also, one can
observe that the players sometimes leave the NE state due to
the second property (change a radio on a channel c ∈ Cmax
in a stable state with probability ²), but they quickly return to
it.
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Suppose that the total data rate per channel is Rt(kc) =
54Mbps, for any kc. In Figure 9, we present a snapshot of
the total payoff for the players in one of the NE reached in
the previous simulation. One can observe that the total payoff
is very similar for the players, hence we conclude that our
algorithm converges to fair channel allocations.
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Fig. 9. Total payoff received by each device in the NE channel allocation.
We have the parameter values |C| = 8, |N | = 10 and k = 3.
Next, we investigate the effect of the number of radios per
device on the efficiency ratio (shown in Figure 10a) and on the
convergence time of the algorithm (presented in Figure 10b).
We can observe on the figures that Algorithm 2 converges
fast with high efficiency ratio if the number of radios per
device is 3 or 5. The higher the number of radios per device,
the more channels the players know. Hence, more information
helps them making their decisions. This is the reason that the
convergence is slower if the number of radios is 2. For two
radios per devices, the effect of changing the channel for even
one radio has a significant impact that undermines the stability
of the NE more easily. If the number of radios is 4, then
convergence is slow for another reason: There is only one Nash
equilibrium channel allocation, namely the perfectly flat one;
thus it takes more time to find it. With longer convergence,
the efficiency ratio decreases as well.
In Figures 10c and 10d, we investigate the effect of the
number of players, each device having three radios. We can
see that our distributed algorithm keeps the system in an
efficient state, although the efficiency is slightly lower for
multiples of |N | with higher convergence time. As mentioned
above, the reason is that in this case, there exists only one NE
(the perfectly load-balanced) and thus it is more difficult to
converge to.
In summary, we can observe that, in spite of the fact
that convergence is not theoretically ensured, the proposed
distributed algorithm based on imperfect information ensures
high system performance and good convergence time.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the problem of com-
petitive channel allocation among devices that use multiple
radios. Our main conclusion is that, in spite of the non-
cooperative behavior of such devices, their Nash equilibrium
channel allocations result in load balancing. We have also
studied fairness issues and coalition-proof NE. Finally, we
have provided three algorithms to achieve the efficient, load-
balancing Nash equilibrium channel allocation and we have
studied their convergence properties either theoretically or
numerically.
In terms of future work, we will extend our current model
to include different channel characteristics and payoffs. We
will also pursue our theoretical investigations of selfish multi-
radio channel allocation for general topologies. We will pay
particular attention to the application of existing fairness
metrics in the competitive context. In addition, we will take
the cost of channel scanning into consideration. Last but not
least, we will study convergence algorithms that achieve Nash
equilibria in general topologies.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Adya, P. Bahl, J. Padhye, A. Wolman, and L. Zhou. A multi-radio
unification protocol for IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. In Proceedings
of Broadnets’04, pages 344–354, Lausanne, Switzerland, 2004.
[2] I. F. Akyildiz, X. Wang, and W. Wang. Wireless mesh networks: A
survey. Computer Networks, Elsevier North-Holland, Inc., 47:445–487,
Mar. 2005.
[3] M. Alicherry, R. Bhatia, and L. (Erran) Li. Joint channel assignment
and routing for throughput optimization in multi-radio wireless mesh
networks. In Proceedings of ACM/IEEE International Conference
on Mobile Computing and Networking (Mobicom’05), pages 58–72,
Cologne, Germany, Aug. 28 - Sep. 2 2005.
[4] B. D. Bernheim, B. Peleg, and M. D. Whinston. Coalition-proof Nash
equilibria: I concepts. Journal of Economic Theory, 42(1), Jun. 1987.
[5] D. Bertsekas and R. Gallager. Data Networks. Prentice-Hall, 2nd ed.,
1992.
[6] G. Bianchi. Performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coor-
dination function. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication,
18(3), Mar. 2000.
[7] M. Cagalj, S. Ganeriwal, I. Aad, and J.-P. Hubaux. On selfish behavior
in CSMA/CA networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Communications (INFOCOM ’05), Miami, USA, Mar. 13-17
2005.
[8] L. Cao and H. Zheng. Distributed spectrum allocation via local
bargaining. In Proceedings of IEEE SECON’05), Santa Clara, California,
USA, Sep. 26-29 2005.
[9] M. M. L. Cheng and J. C. I. Chuang. Performance evaluation of
distributed measurement-based dynamic channel assignment in local
wireless communications. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Com-
munications, 14(4):698–710, May 1996.
[10] D. C. Cox and D. O. Reudink. Dynamic channel assignment in two
dimension large-scale mobile radio systems. Bell Sys. Tech., 51:1611–
1628, 1972.
[11] M. Fe´legyha´zi. Non-cooperative Behavior in Wireless Networks. PhD
thesis, EPFL – Switzerland, Apr. 2007.
[12] M. Fe´legyha´zi and J.-P. Hubaux. Game theory in wireless networks: A
tutorial. Technical Report LCA-REPORT-2006-002, EPFL, Feb. 2006.
[13] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991.
[14] M. M. Halldo´rsson, J. Y. Halpern, L. (Erran) Li, and V. S. Mirrokni.
On spectrum sharing games. In Proceedings of the 23rd annual ACM
symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC 2004), pages
107–114, St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada, Jul. 25-28 2004.
[15] S. Haykin. Cognitive radio: Brain-empowered wireless communications.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC), 23(2):201–
220, Feb. 2005.
[16] I. Katzela and M. Naghshineh. Channel assignment schemes for cellular
mobile telecommunication systems: a comprehensive survey. IEEE
Personal Communications, 3(3):10–31, Jun. 1996.
[17] J. Konorski. Multiple access in ad-hoc wireless LANs with noncoop-
erative stations. In Proceedings of Networking 2002, pages 1141–1146,
2002.
[18] E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. In
Proceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of
Computer Science (STACS’99), Mar. 1999.
[19] A. B. MacKenzie and S. B. Wicker. Stability of multipacket slotted
aloha with selfish users and perfect information. In Proceedings of the
IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM ’03), San
Francisco, USA, Mar. 30 - Apr. 3 2003.
IEEE INFOCOM 2007 9
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
number of radios/device
e
ffi
cie
nc
y 
ra
tio
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
number of radios/device
co
n
ve
rg
en
ce
 ti
m
e
(a) (b)
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
number of players
e
ffi
cie
nc
y 
ra
tio
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
number of players
co
n
ve
rg
en
ce
 ti
m
e
(c) (d)
Fig. 10. The effect of the total number of radios: (a) The efficiency ratio and (b) the convergence time as a function of the number of radios per device k.
Similarly, we show (c) the efficiency ratio and (d) the convergence time as a function of the number of players |N |. The simulation parameters are |C| = 8,
² = 10−4 and W = 15. In addition, we used the following default values |N | = 10 and k = 3, where they did not correspond to the measured parameter.
[20] A. Mishra, S. Banerjee, and W. Arbaugh. Weighted coloring based chan-
nel assignment for WLANs. Mobile Computing and Communications
Review (MC2R), 9(3), 2005.
[21] N. Nie and C. Comaniciu. Adaptive channel allocation spectrum
etiquette for cognitive radio networks. In Proceedings of IEEE Dynamic
Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN’05), Baltimore, USA, Nov. 2005.
[22] A. Raniwala and T.-C. Chiueh. Architecture and algorithms for an IEEE
802.11-based multi-channel wireless mesh network. In Proceedings of
the IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM ’05),
Miami, USA, Mar. 13-17 2005.
[23] T. S. Rappaport. Wireless Communications: Principles and Practice
(2nd Edition). Prentice Hall, 2002.
[24] M. Schwartz. Mobile Wireless Communications. Cambridge Univ. Press,
2005.
[25] J. van den Heuvel, R. A. Leese, and M. A. Shepherd. Graph labeling
and radio channel assignment. Journal of Graph Theory, 29:263–283,
1998.
[26] J. Zander and H. Eriksson. Asymptotic bounds on the performance of
a class of dynamic channels assignment algorithms. IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC), 11(6):926–933, Aug. 1993.
[27] H. Zheng and L. Cao. Device-centric spectrum management. In
Proceedings of IEEE DySPAN’05), Baltimore, USA, Nov. 8-11 2005.
